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1 Strictly speaking, this welfare
measure utilizes a compensat-
ed demand schedule, which
keeps the consumer at the











THE CONCEPT OF THE
OPTIMAL MONEY STOCK
T
he concept of the optimal stock of money
introduced by Milton Friedman (1969)
has stimulated much discussion and
controversy.  More recently, Lucas (1994)
has provided new estimates of the welfare
gain for the American economy from setting
the optimal level of real cash balances.  Before
turning to a critique of Lucas, let us provide
a rationale for this concept of optimality.
To society, real balances are produced
at zero marginal costs.  To an individual,
however, there is a cost to holding cash
that bears no interest rather than bonds,
which yield a money rate of interest.  An
individual would willingly incur this cost
only if real balances produced services on
the margin equal to the foregone interest.
A lower interest rate reduces this cost and
increases the total services provided by real
cash balances.  One estimate of the consump-
tionthe consumer would forego—to get this
potential maximum gain from holding
cash—is the area under the money demand
schedule between the quantity of cash held
at the lowest possible rate of interest (per-
haps zero) and the smaller quantity that
would be held at a higher interest rate.1
Clearly any measure of this gain
depends on the particular demand
schedule used.  Lucas utilizes a double log
schedule rather than the semi-log schedule
used by Friedman (1969) and Martin Bailey
(1956).  The Lucas’ double log schedule
yields greater welfare gains since the level
of cash balances always increases as the
interest rate approaches zero.  In contrast,
the semi-log schedule implies a ﬁnite level
of cash is held at a zero nominal interest.
In a later section we will provide a fuller
discussion of these schedules.
LUCAS’ EXPOSITION
What reduction in consumption would
compensate for and measure the gain in utility
from a larger stock of cash?  An exact measure
of this gain is derived by Lucas in the case
of both the double log (the constant elasticity
schedule) and semi-log demand schedules
for real cash balances.  He assumes a time-
separable constant-relative-risk-averse utility
function with consumption and the ratio
of real balances to consumption as arguments.
This function is compatible with steady
growth of a non-durable output.  A repre-
sentative agent maximizes it subject to a
budget constraint.
Such an inﬁnite horizon model, (see
Ramsey [1927] and Sidrauski [1967]), implies
that we need not be concerned with changes
in the real rate of interest as we vary the
growth of nominal money balances.  Note
the contrast to Mundell (1963) and Tobin
(1965) models in which the accumulation
of non-interest bearing real balances competes
with physical capital as vehicles for the
savings of ﬁnite-lived individuals.  In their
models, a faster growth of nominal money
raises the actual and anticipated rates of price
change.  The capital loss on real balances
spurs the accumulation of physical capital.
A new steady state is reached:  Capital and
per capita output are higher and the real
rate of interest is lower.  In the Ramsey-
type model used by Lucas, the real rate is
tied to the ﬁxed utility discount factor of
the representative agent.  When the rate of
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2 For the details of these calcula-
tions, see Lucas (1994).
3 It is crucial that the income
elasticity is unity.  If this were
not the case, we could not use
steady state analysis. If the
income elasticity were less then
one, real balances would fall as
a ratio to real income and any
welfare gain would become
increasingly small.
4 The semi-log schedule was used
by Cagan in his classic paper
(1956). Since the real rate
was very small, as compared to
the rate of inﬂation under
hyperinﬂation, he used the
expected rate of inﬂation as the
opportunity cost of holding real
balances.
5 This result simply states that a
monopolist facing a demand
curve with a constant elasticity
less than unity can always
increase total revenue by rais-
ing relative price.
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price change is fully anticipated, the money
rate of interest adjusts to give borrowers
and lenders the same ﬁxed real rate.  With
a constant real rate, the demand schedule
for real balances represents alternative steady
states with the nominal interest rate adjusting
one-for-one with the rate of price change.
Lucas approximates exact measures of
the gain in utility by the consumer surplus
under both the constant and semi-log sched-
ules.For the range of interest rates in U.S.
history, the approximations are very close
to the exact compensating variation using
these demand functions.2
THE NATURE OF THE
DEMAND SCHEDULE:
BAILEY VS. LUCAS
The constant elasticity schedule is
M/P5Ar2hyb, where Mis nominal money,
Pis the price level, yis real income and rthe
nominal interest rate (money rate).  The
income elasticity, b, is taken as unity and
the estimated interest elasticity, h,is0.5.3
Although the demand for real balances
increases without limit as the money rate
approaches zero, the integral converges.
If other taxes distort (such as a tax on
labor income), it is uncertain whether welfare
improves if the authorities drive the money
rate of interest towards zero.  Other taxes
would have to be raised to run a budget
surplus and retire money at a rate equal to
the real interest rate minus the output growth
rate.  Any welfare gain from higher real
balances would have to be weighed against
the welfare cost of increased taxes.  Even in
this case, however, Lucas estimated optimal
money rate remains very close to zero.
As Lucas notes, Bailey (1956) approxi-
matedthe exact welfare loss by the consumer
surplus integral under the semi-log demand
schedule, M/P 5ege-aE, where egis an index
of real balances held at zero anticipated
inﬂation.4Lucas prefers a constant elasticity
demand function on the grounds that it ﬁts
the American data.
Before proceeding with a critique of
Lucas, it is useful to discuss the properties
of the constant elasticity function.  Unlike
the semi-log, the constant elasticity func-
tion does not generate a Laffer curve.
Along a Laffer curve, as the inﬂation tax
rate (the money rate) rises, the revenue
increases.  It reaches a maximum, then it
declines.  Using the Phelps (1973) and
Auernheimer (1974) deﬁnition of the
revenue as (M/P)(r), the revenue
(R 5rAr2h5Ar(12h)) continuously
increases with inﬂation.5
Although the double log function may ﬁt
the American data that includes only mod-
eraterates of inﬂation, it is not evident that
the schedule should be extended—as Lucas
does—to regions of hyperinﬂation, or for that
matter, a deﬂation of prices approaching the
real rate.  Bali (1998) has run tests using
the Box-Cox transformation to determine
whether the constant or semi-elastic function
best ﬁts the data.  Over the range of data in
the United States (therefore not at hyperin-
flation or at rates of interest approaching zero),
the double log performs better.  For non-U.S.
hyper-inﬂations, the semi-log ﬁts better,
however.  Weshould be very cautious about
extrapolating to non-observable ranges of the
data.  Since data are not available at rates of
interest close to zero, we proceed to discuss
Lucas’ (1994) extension to hyperinﬂation
where international data are available. 
EXTENSION TO
HYPERINFLATION
Cagan (1956) found that the semi-log
ﬁts the data for seven European countries
during periods of hyperinﬂation.  The semi-
log generates a Laffer curve:  The steady state
maximum revenue is at
.
Cagan concluded that governments often
inﬂated beyond this point, an overshooting
paradox which he explained as follows.
The revenue is the product of real balances
(which depend on expected inﬂation) and
the tax rate (the actual inﬂation).  The
authorities, therefore, could exploit a lag
in expected inﬂation to temporarily get






6 These optimal tax rules appear
to have been recently rediscov-
ered.  For an earlier account
see Marty (1976a, 1976b).
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expectations are adaptive.  If inﬂation is
held constant, expectations catch up and
the revenue falls below its steady state level.
If the authorities attempt to exploit this lag
repeatedly, a constant coefﬁcient on adap-
tive expectations would imply serially-cor-
related errors, or the coefﬁcient itself would
be revised.  Cagan’s explanation rests on
the joint hypothesis of adaptive expectations
and the semi-log schedule. 
Lucas (1994) sees no problem in
extending the double-log to hyperinﬂation.
Indeed, it clears up Cagan’s overshooting
paradox.  With the double log, additional
revenue always accrues at higher inﬂation.
Moreover, no lag exists since Lucas
assumes expectations are rational.
A constant growth of money (above
Cagan’s steady state maximum) would provide
a controlled experiment allowing us to dis-
tinguish between these two composite
hypotheses.  If Cagan’s joint hypothesis is
correct, the revenue should ﬁrst rise and
then fall permanently.  If Lucas’ joint hypoth-
esisis correct, the revenue should be
unchanged.  The real world does not pro-
vide us with neat experiments, however.
Nor would the experiment allow us to dis-
tinguish between aspects of the composite
hypothesis:  With either demand function,
no lag occurs if expectations are rational.
The German hyperinﬂation lasted for
only a few years.  The pattern of revenue
was oscillating:  It rose and fell in cycles
depending on the ﬁscal needs of the author-
ities.In any case, the Box-Cox transformations
come down squarely on the side of the
semi-log.  Is the Cagan overshooting paradox
explainable by a regime change so that adap-
tiveexpectations are—for a time—rational?
Or, even under rational expectations and
the semi-log money demand function, do
we have a case of time inconsistency?
Here is a fascinating area of research for
which data are available.
OPTIMAL TAX ON REAL
BALANCES
We next turn to how the use of the
double log rather than the semi-log affects
the analysis of the optimal tax on cash
(which well may be zero).  Bailey used the
average welfare-cost-per-dollar of revenue
to measure the social costs of seignorage.
Later, it was suggested that the marginal
welfare-costs-per-dollar be set equal to the
average of the distortions due to other taxes.
General equilibrium theorists such as Ballard,
Shoven and Walley (1985) have calculated the
average value of these marginal welfare-costs-
per-dollar of revenue for distortionary taxes.
Including a tax on cash balances in the menu
of taxes, the procedure for calculating the
optimal tax rate is to set the marginal revenue
from money creation equal to the average
of the marginal distortions due to other taxes.
This calculation accepts, in the spirit of the
second best, the preexisting distortions caused
by other taxes and assumes that any addi-
tional revenue occurring from the tax on cash
is used for exhaustive expenditure rather than
rebated to the private sector in the form of
lower taxes.  This procedure is one of many
possible ways of handling second best
optimal tax policy.
Given a constant real rate, the rate of
price change sets the money rate of interest.
For any demand function,
,
the revenue is deﬁned as the money rate (r)
times the quantity of money demanded at
that rate, R 5 r (r).  The ratio of marginal
welfare cost to the marginal increment to
revenue is a function of the interest elasticity
as given by
,
where W is the welfare loss.  This result is
a variant of Ramsey’s inverse elasticity rule:
Tax most heavily commodities in inelastic
demand.  It is a partial equilibrium result
that implies the shifting of resources is from
the taxed to the untaxed sector so that all
cross elasticities are zero.  In the special case
that the optimal tax structure is proportional,
real balances should be not taxed at all.6
















the average and marginal ratios are equal.
The proof is simple: the welfare loss
W5hAr(12h)/12h.  Since the revenue is
(theaverage ratio) 5h/12h(the marginal
ratio). 
With a constant elasticity, if dW/dRis
greater than for other taxes, real balances
shouldn’t be taxed at all. But what if it is less?
There appears to be no equilibrium solution.
The double log highlights a problem with
this approach, a failing that is independentof
the demand function used.
To see this, take the semi-log function,
set values for the real rate and the semi-
elasticity, and then solve for the optimal
money rate.  This determines the optimal
rate of price change that equates dW/dRfor
real balances to the value for other taxes.
The difﬁculty is that the authorities
don’t directly control the money rate of
interest, they control the monetary base.
Holding other taxes constant and varying
the expenditure side makes no sense.  In
the double log case, if dW/dRfor cash were
lower than the average for other taxes,
expenditures would increase without limit!
The proper technique is to hold expenditures
constant and optimally substitute one tax
for another.  No shortcut avoids estimating
the welfare effects of altering other taxes.
THE COMPOSITION OF THE
MONEY SUPPLY
We turn to the question of what is the
proper deﬁnition of the money supply.  Lucas
deﬁnes the money supply as M1 and runs
his welfare integrals from zero to a positive
money rate—a procedure that adds high-
powered money and interest bearing
deposits and treats this composite as non-
interest bearing.  In this regard, it is
relevant to return to Bailey’s classic article
and review his treatment of currency 
and deposits.
Bailey used Cagan’s data to estimate the
welfare cost of the inﬂation.  He set the real
rate at zero (its level is too small to play a
role in hyperinﬂation) so that the cost of
holding currency was the anticipated inﬂa-
tion (a proxy for the money rate).  He assumed
competitive banks pay interest on deposits
but are subject to a sterile legal reserve
requirement.  A zero proﬁt condition was
imposed:  The revenue from interest-bearing
assets was completely dispersed in interest
payments on deposits.  Under these assump-
tions, competition would force banks to pay
on deposits (D) the money rate, r, (i.e., the
rate of inﬂation) on loans, L, times 12z,
the reserve ratio.  Zero proﬁts are earned
since D(12z)r5rL.  The cost of holding
deposits is rz: the difference between r (the
money rate on bonds) and the interest on
deposits, r(12z).  Since deposits are partially
indexed against the inﬂation, Bailey assumed
that at very high rates of inﬂation, the public
uses only deposits and all currency would
be held as bank reserves.  Bailey’s welfare
integrals run from zero to rz reﬂecting the
partial indexing of the deposit rate to inﬂa-
tion.  Bailey then contrasts a currency-only
economy with a bank-only economy.  To get
the same revenue and incur the same wel-
fare cost as in a currency economy, the bank
economy can inﬂate at a rate equal to that
in the currency world multiplied by the
reciprocal of the reserve ratio.  The inﬂation
rate is P/z, but the cost of holding deposits
is Pz so that the public holds the same real
balances as in a currency-only world.  Although
the tax rate is P/z, the tax base is zD so the
tax revenue is the same as in a currency-only
world.  In contrast to Lucas, for Bailey there
is a substantial reduction in welfare costs
since the interest on deposits is partially
indexed against inﬂation.
How satisfactory is Bailey’s treatment of
the different roles of currency and deposits?
In the ﬁrst place, there is no model of the
general case where individuals hold both
currency and deposits.  Their distinct roles
are not analyzed.  Note, for example, the
comparison of the currency and the banking










curve for currency is the same as that for
deposits.  Moreover, the zero-proﬁt condition
ignores any marginal costs of intermediation
for which the banks would have to be com-
pensated.  Nor is this all.  Bailey makes the
implicit assumption—which may be correct—
that individuals move from currency into
deposits as the percentage point difference
π(12z) between the yield on currency and
deposits rises.  At high inﬂation, this move-
mentis complete and all currency is held as
bank reserves.
We, like Lucas, make no claim to fully
analyze the role of currency and deposits.
The real issue is the polar choice between
two very incomplete models, however.  On
the one hand, we can lump currency and
deposits together and assume that both pay
no interest.   We can then run our integrals
from zero to the money rate of interest.  This
is Lucas’ choice.  On the other hand, we could
assume with Bailey that all high-powered
money is held as reserves and run the wel-
fare integrals from a money rate of zero to
rz, the opportunity cost of holding interest
bearing deposits.  Lucas’ choice overstates
the welfare loss when we deviate from the
Friedman rule.  The assumption in Bailey,
that all deposits pay interest, underestimates
the welfare loss.  Without a theory of banking
in which the distinctive roles of currency
and deposits are modeled, it remains uncer-
tainhow large is the degree of overestimation
or underestimation.7
As an alternative to these two polar
positions, one might tentatively try modeling
the distinct roles of currency and deposits.
Making the bold assumption that currency
and deposits face the same demand function
(including the elasticity), it would be pos-
sible to run separate integrals:  For currency,
the integration would run from a zero money
rate to a positive rate: For deposits, it
wouldrun from zero to rz. The general
expressionfor the welfare loss (W) is
With the constant elasticity schedule M/P5
Ar2h, the welfare loss is
At z50, only currency would incur a wel-
fare loss; as zapproached 1, the welfare loss
on deposits would increasingly approximate
the loss on currency.  All these models make
the unsatisfactory assumption that the same
demand schedule applies to currency and
deposits. Moreover, the intermediate model
assumes that the currency-deposit weights
remain unchanged, which is unlikely during
high rates of inﬂation.
Despite these defects, our preference—in
an era of increasing ﬁnancial deregulation of
interest rates—is to go the intermediate route.
We came across Ed Prescott’s comments
on a paper by King and Wolman (1996)
towards the completion of this paper.  Prescott
criticizes the authors’ analysis:
The theory has households holding 
non-interest bearingmoney, while
the monetary aggregate used in the
demand for money function is M1.
Most of M1 is not non-interest-
bearing debtheld by households.
Only a third of M1 is currency and
half of that is probably held abroad.
Another third is demand deposits
held by businesses, which often earn
interestde facto. Households do not
use these demand deposits to econ-
omizeon shopping time.  The
ﬁnal third is demand deposits
held by households that, at least
in recent years, canpay interest.
This criticism is also applicable to
Lucas’ treatment.
CONCLUSION
Our discussion has shown skepticism
about Lucas’ extension of the double log
schedule to both very low as well as very
high money rates of interest (periods of
hyperinﬂation).  Since data are not available
for the American economy at very low money
rates, we have discussed the implications
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7 Lucas is quite upfront about the
need for an explicit theory of
banking to distinguish between
the separate roles of currency





more commonly used semi-log in hyperin-
ﬂation.  This is a fascinating area for
research since data are available in hyper-
inﬂation periods. 
Turning to the gains from going to
very low rates of interest in the American
economy, it would appear that Lucas over-
estimates these gains.  If M1 is used as a
relevant money supply, some correction
should be made for the interest paid on
portions of M1.  (We contrasted Bailey’s
treatment with Lucas’.)  Moreover, more
than half of U.S. currency is held abroad
by foreigners. Note that this affects any
estimate of the welfare gains when either
the monetary base or M1 is used.  What
remains is a cautionary tale.  We should
treat any estimates of the welfare costs
with caution when the distinct roles of
currency and deposits are not modeled.
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